UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/301
16 March 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the communiqué adopted in Dushanbe on 15 March 1994 at the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries of Central Asia and the Russian Federation.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) L. KAYUMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Communiqué adopted on 15 March 1994 at the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the countries of Central Asia and the Russian Federation

On 14 and 15 March 1994, a meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan was held in Dushanbe. The meeting took place in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding and was conducted in a businesslike and constructive manner.

The Ministers noted that, as a result of the efforts of the leaders of Tajikistan, which were supported by friendly States and assisted by international organizations, a certain degree of social and political stabilization has been achieved in Tajikistan: the organs of State power are operating fully and the difficult process of rehabilitating the national economy is under way.

They approved the joint efforts of the countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States - the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan - to safeguard the Tajik-Afghan border in accordance with the Treaty on Collective Security, signed at Tashkent on 15 May 1992. They also supported for the request, addressed to the President of the Security Council by the head of the Tajik State, Mr. Emomali Rakhmonov, that the collective peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan should be granted the status of a United Nations operation.

The Ministers expressed great concern at the continuing tension on the Tajik-Afghan border which, in their opinion, is destabilizing the situation in Tajikistan and the region and hindering the solution of the conflict in Tajikistan.

They supported the measures being taken by the leaders of Tajikistan to achieve a political settlement of the conflict, and expressed the hope that armed actions on the Tajik-Afghan border will be halted when negotiations are begun.

The Ministers expressed their great appreciation for the attention that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has given to the problems of Tajikistan, and for the efforts of his Special Envoy, Mr. Ramiro Piriz-Ballón, and of the Russian Federation to achieve a speedy settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan through political dialogue. They noted that the adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan and the holding of free elections will promote the rapid normalization of the situation in Tajikistan.

The Ministers expressed serious concern at the worsening situation in Afghanistan. They hope that all parties involved in the conflict will endeavour to find the political means for achieving national harmony and civil peace.

They stressed the need for close cooperation among their States with a view to expanding economic, cultural and other ties and strengthening the process of integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The Ministers reaffirmed their readiness to promote progress in the development of relations between their States and contribute to the solution of complex problems of concern to their peoples, and agreed to hold regular political consultations.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/302
16 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a statement, dated 14 March 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria.

I would kindly ask you to bring this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council in connection with the consideration of the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 900 (1994).

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Slavi PASHOVSKI
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 14 March 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria

From the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria consistently supports all initiatives of the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and other international institutions leading to the speedy achievement of a lasting and equitable solution.

The resolution of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of key importance to overcoming the overall crisis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Favourable prospects for restoring peace through a federate and confederate constitution are taking shape. The more active role of European and international institutions, the United States and the Russian Federation is an indication of the common concern of the international community about putting an end to the bloodshed in a European country at the end of the twentieth century.

In this connection, it is pertinent to point out once again the importance and the role of the peace-keeping forces under the auspices of the United Nations. Along with this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria once again calls attention to the appeal of Bulgaria to the Balkan States not to participate with armed forces in resolving the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. When making a decision on this issue both the need for a quantitative increase of the United Nations Protection Force contingent at the present moment and the perspective future stability in the region should be taken into consideration.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bulgaria states once again that Bulgaria will not participate, either directly or indirectly, in the military operations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/303
16 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1994 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I regret to inform you that our Government sources report today continued and unabated heavy shelling of Maglaj. These reports have been already confirmed by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The population in this area is exposed to great danger and its existence is in jeopardy.

In the spirit of the recently adopted presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/11), we urge the Council to take immediate action to declare Maglaj a "safe area" in the context of its resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) in order to deter further attacks and add to the positive developments towards peace.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Deputy Permanent Representative

94-13495 (E) 160394

160394

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/304
16 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is the third in a series of reports that I have been submitting to the Security Council on the activities of the Electoral Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) until the elections scheduled for 20 March 1994 are held. This is a special report that summarizes the activities of the Electoral Division and attempts to provide an overview of the unfolding of the electoral process up to election day. My last report (S/1994/179) was issued on 16 February 1994 and there will be another report issued immediately after the elections that will include comments on the events on election day and an assessment of the overall conduct of the election as monitored by international observers of the United Nations.

II. DEPLOYMENT OF THE ELECTORAL COMPONENT

2. The Electoral Division of ONUSAL was established in September 1993 with a mandate to observe the electoral process before, during and after the elections under the following terms of reference:

(a) To observe that measures and decisions made by all electoral authorities are impartial and consistent with the holding of free and fair elections;

(b) To observe that appropriate steps are taken to ensure that eligible voters are included in the electoral rolls, thus enabling them to exercise their right to vote;

(c) To observe that mechanisms are in place effectively to prevent multiple voting, given that a complete screening of the electoral rolls prior to the elections is not feasible;

(d) To observe that freedom of expression, organization, movement and assembly are respected without restrictions;

(e) To observe that potential voters have sufficient knowledge of the mechanisms for participating in the election;

(f) To examine, analyse and assess criticisms made, objections raised and attempts undertaken to delegitimize the electoral process and, if required, to convey such information to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal;

(g) To inform the Supreme Electoral Tribunal of complaints received regarding irregularities in electoral advertising or possible interferences with the electoral process; when appropriate, to request information on corrective measures taken by the Tribunal;

(h) To place observers at all polling sites on election day to verify that the right to vote is fully respected.

3. The Electoral Division has been functioning for six months with 36 Professional staff deployed through 6 regional offices. In spite of the rather small number of staff, the electoral component has been able to perform the observation duties assigned to it on the basis of coordination with, and the close collaboration of, the other components of ONUSAL. In addition to observing the activities of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the political parties, other public organizations and the mass media, the ONUSAL teams have been providing technical and logistic support in the preparation of the register of voters in all regions of the country. By the end of the campaign period, the ONUSAL teams had made an average of 9 observation visits to each of the country's 262 towns, or more than 2,350 visits, and had also dispatched a total of 3,700 patrols. In the course of providing this support, some 437,000 kilometres of travel and roughly 270 hours of helicopter flying time were logged.

III. OBSERVATION ACTIVITIES

4. ONUSAL promoted discussions with a view to obtaining the signing of codes of conduct by political parties. Pacts of this kind were signed by all contending parties in each of the 14 departments of El Salvador as well as in a number of municipalities. On 10 March, at ONUSAL headquarters, all presidential candidates signed a declaration in which they declared their rejection of violence and their commitment to respect the results of the elections and to comply with the Peace Accords. Periodic meetings with political parties were held at the central and local levels in order to discuss ongoing problems and viable solutions. The Electoral Division held joint meetings on a regular basis with the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Board of Vigilance, which is made up of representatives of all political parties, and the party campaign managers with a view to solving any possible problem arising during the electoral process. It was at these meetings that technical proposals to improve the registration process were discussed and evaluated.

5. The Division has met with more than 70 delegations from Governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, universities and the media seeking information about the electoral process. During the months preceding the elections, ONUSAL has been approached by representatives of

various organizations which intend to monitor the elections by mobilizing some 2,000 international observers, in addition to ONUSAL's own observers. The Electoral Division has prepared a kit containing documents on electoral procedures and international observation, as well as reports of the Secretary-General. These documents are available to those delegations and reporters who seek information at ONUSAL.

6. ONUSAL has mobilized 900 international observers to be deployed prior to election day in all of the 262 municipalities of El Salvador. There will be an observer team at each of the 355 polling centres, which constitute a total of 6,970 polling stations. The number of observers per team will vary according to the size of the polling centre at a ratio of approximately 10 stations per observer. The ONUSAL observers will cover the conduct of the polls on 20 March as well as the counting of votes both at the polling station and at the Supreme Electoral Tribunal later that day and over the following days. After election day, a public statement will be made by ONUSAL on the conduct of the election.

IV. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

7. The preparation of the electoral register was a central issue from the beginning of the process. As stated in my last report (S/1994/179, para. 17), at the closure of the register, and in overall quantitative terms, the registration of voters can be considered satisfactory. The electoral lists include the names of over 2,700,000 Salvadorians, of whom more than 2,350,000 may be in possession of a voting card when the deadline period for delivery of cards closes on 12 March. This figure amounts to over 85 per cent of the estimated voting-age population. Some flaws and outstanding difficulties with regard to registration and the lists of voters are described below.

8. One major flaw of the Register is that over 74,000 persons requesting registration have not been included because their application could not be validated by a birth certificate. At the national level, that figure amounts to 2.8 per cent of the entire register of voters. Nevertheless, there are 35 municipalities in former conflict zones where the average of non-validated applications amounts to 10.4 per cent, more than triple the national average. In absolute terms, the number of those applications translates to over 10,000. This occurred in spite of the fact that 2 extensive plans for the recovery of more than 360,000 birth certificates from municipal offices were implemented with the assistance of ONUSAL and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), concentrating more intensively in the former conflict zones. Nearly 60,000 applications for registration were validated on the results of those plans. Since destruction of registers was particularly frequent in these areas, it was there that an exceptionality decree for the redocumentation of citizens was more broadly applied.

9. A way to solve the problem of the remaining non-validated applications was provided for in articles 30, 48 and 51 of the Electoral Code, whereby corrections and claims may be made with regard to the Register during a time period to be established by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal. In practice, although the Tribunal issued instructions on this matter via the media, it failed to include specific deadlines for citizens to submit complaints. During

the last days of February and up to 6 March, ONUSAL teams observed that requests for corrections and submission of birth certificates for the validation of voter applications were being accepted by the Tribunal. Approximately 5,000 claims of citizens who did not have a voting card owing to the lack of a birth certificate were processed by the Tribunal.

10. Another problem that still persists with regard to the Register is the possibility of multiple voting by persons in possession of several voter cards under the same or different identities. It is impossible to determine the number of persons in such circumstances. On the one hand, the names of deceased citizens were not removed from the Register for technical reasons. On the other hand, double registration of the same person under different identities was made possible by the legal framework that was designed to deal with certain exceptional circumstances of displaced populations and destroyed registries. Multiple voting by persons with several cards can be prevented only by appropriate use of indelible ink at the time of voting. In this matter, the electoral authorities, as well as the party monitors and international observers, will have to take special care to ensure that the ink is preserved and properly utilized.

11. ONUSAL teams have observed cases of citizens who, despite the appearance of their names on the voter lists, were unable to obtain their voter cards because their registration card was not available even after all cards had been sent to the field. There were also citizens who had a voter card, but whose names did not appear on the list of the municipality where they had chosen to vote. While at least some of these cases may have been corrected by the Tribunal in response to claimants, the extent of the problem could not be quantified and difficulties may arise on election day.

V. ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN AND RESPECT OF BASIC FREEDOMS

12. Under the terms of reference of its electoral component, ONUSAL was asked to observe whether freedom of expression, movement, organization and assembly were being respected without restrictions. In monitoring campaign activities, ONUSAL teams have attended more than 800 events, mainly political meetings and demonstrations, that have generally taken place in an orderly, well-organized manner. Despite the absence of security forces at two thirds of the events, only a few serious incidents have occurred. Although some persons were seriously injured, no fatalities have been reported from campaign activities. Approximately 34 per cent of events monitored by ONUSAL were organized by the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA); 32 per cent by the coalition composed of the Convergencia Democrática (CD), the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN); 16 per cent by the Christian Democratic Party; and 18 per cent by other parties. These activities were proof that freedom of movement, demonstration and expression were respected in a way that contributes to the holding of an election in a free manner.

13. Political advertising through the mass media has also been monitored by ONUSAL. All the parties are present in most media, although with different intensity. ARENA has consistently taken the lead in advertising time, on both

radio and television, followed closely by the Christian Democratic Party, and at a further distance by the CD/MNR/FMLN coalition and other parties. As for the content of political advertising, it has been found to be generally congenial to the prescriptions of electoral legislation. Nevertheless, the Electoral Division of ONUSAL has received a number of complaints from different political parties regarding the use of public resources to promote indirectly the governing party. In addition, although there is a ban on publicity of government programmes 30 days prior to the elections, in monitoring the media the Electoral Division itself has ascertained that several ministries and governmental agencies were advertising their own programmes up to the time of the drafting of the present report.

14. There has been publicity on television and the radio and in newspapers by a private institute and also by anonymous advertisers, the content of which is strongly hostile to FMLN and to the presidential candidate of the CD/MNR/FMLN coalition. Besides violating article 4 of the electoral propaganda rules, whereby only political parties and coalitions may make use of electoral propaganda, this publicity also violates article 18 of the rules, which stipulates that no party shall include in its publicity emblems, symbols and insignia used by other parties. Although the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ordered these advertisements to be withdrawn, they continued to be published. In all cases, the content of this publicity runs counter to the spirit of peace and reconciliation that should preside over the elections. There has also been some publicity by ARENA and the Convergencia Democrática with elements that may violate article 18 of the electoral propaganda rules.

15. Complaints of irregularities in electoral publicity and other aspects of the electoral process were in a timely manner transmitted by ONUSAL to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in accordance with the terms of reference of the Electoral Division. Communication with the Tribunal included not only complaints presented to ONUSAL by claimants from different sources, mostly political parties, but also reports on problems identified in the field by ONUSAL observers. These communications covered most of the issues subject to public discussion. In some cases, they were solved by action from the Tribunal. In this connection, ONUSAL made recommendations to the Tribunal as appropriate. Some 300 complaints were presented to ONUSAL during the campaign period, most of them (23 per cent) dealing with arbitrary or illegitimate action by public authorities. The remainder consisted of acts of intimidation (21 per cent), destruction of propaganda materials (18 per cent), aggression (9 per cent), murder (7 per cent) and miscellaneous complaints (22 per cent).

16. With regard to civic education, extensive media advertising was undertaken by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal during the registration process and in the final phase of the campaign, at which time emphasis was placed on how to vote. In addition, a number of well-funded NGOs were very active in the field of civic education. Their activities concentrated on the production and massive distribution of materials, such as pamphlets and brochures. Massive civic education campaigns were of the utmost importance, as in elections held in the past decade an average of 10 per cent of the ballots were void and blank.

17. Among the problems remaining to be resolved is the issue of location of polling stations in some of the former areas of conflict. In accordance with the law, polling stations have been established in the municipalities throughout the country. But a decision taken by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has resulted in the relocation of four polling stations from their respective municipalities to the departmental capital of Chalatenango. The decision of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is based on its perception that there exists a lack of security and minimal population in these municipalities. This perception is not upheld by ONUSAL observers. The decision of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal has provoked major discussion and strong opposition from political parties and the citizens of these municipalities, including a demonstration of 600 to 700 people in front of the Tribunal offices. ONUSAL has reiterated, in conversations with the Tribunal and in public statements, that the decision to relocate polling stations violates articles 125 and 241 of the Electoral Code. In spite of ongoing protests, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal to date maintains its position.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

18. El Salvador is approaching these elections under political conditions that were unthinkable three years ago. Despite remaining difficulties with the registration of voters and a political climate where mistrust among contenders still persists, the conditions for the holding of free and fair elections are generally adequate. The fact that all political forces are participating for the first time, that basic political freedoms are respected and that the number of violent incidents during the campaign has been limited leads to the expectation that voter turnout will be substantially higher than in previous elections. Furthermore, never before have the rules governing the issuance of the ballot and the counting of the vote been as congenial to democratic standards. There is good reason to expect that these elections will be a crucial stepping-stone in the consolidation of peace and national reconciliation among the Salvadorian people.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/305
16 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter addressed to you by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman, concerning the expiration of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Republic of Croatia.

I would ask for your kind assistance in distributing this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Charge d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Croatia to the
United Nations

Annex

Letter dated 16 March 1994 from the President of the Republic of Croatia to the Secretary-General

On 31 March 1994 the existing mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) will expire, leaving the Security Council with the option of extending it for an additional period of six months. The Republic of Croatia praises the United Nations soldiers and civilian personnel for all of the efforts they have made in their difficult mission of peace in Croatia. We are grateful for their devoted humanitarian effort, which has helped many citizens of Croatia, and we deeply regret the casualties which the international forces have suffered in their brave task.

The Republic of Croatia is once again ready to accept prolongation of the UNPROFOR mandate on its territory, considering the pivotal role of UNPROFOR in the overall peace process. However, in making its final decision regarding the renewal of the UNPROFOR mandate, the Government of Croatia must raise the question of the necessity of improving UNPROFOR's performance.

Full implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions remains the most essential, yet still unfulfilled task of UNPROFOR. With more than 16,000 United Nations peace-keeping troops deployed in Croatia, and considering the precise goals inscribed in the Vance plan (S/23280, annex III), it is difficult to accept the inefficiency of UNPROFOR performance in Croatia. The uncooperative and hostile behaviour of militant Serbian insurgents in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) certainly is a cause of considerable difficulties for UNPROFOR, but they should not be permitted to impede the implementation of any Security Council resolutions.

Security Council resolution 871 (1993) of 4 October 1993 remains the foundation for any future UNPROFOR action in Croatia, as well as the overall framework for initiating the process of the peaceful reintegration of the UNPAs into the legal and economic system of the Republic of Croatia. Croatia stresses in particular the importance of paragraphs 4 and 5 of Security Council resolution 871 (1993). The full normalization of the position of the international community towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) must be preconditioned on the sincere cooperation of its Government in the full and prompt implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia. This includes the provisions of the plan concerning the demilitarization of the UNPAs, as well as the recognition of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders.

In dealing with the question of the UNPAs, the Republic of Croatia would like to recall General Assembly resolution 48/122 of 20 December 1993 entitled "Human rights and terrorism". Actions of the Serbian insurgents in the UNPAs can clearly be characterized as terrorist acts, aimed at the destruction of human rights, threatening the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, destabilizing the legitimately constituted Government of Croatia, undermining a pluralistic civil society and having serious consequences on the economic and social development of Croatia.

Therefore, we call upon the Security Council to consider, in its future deliberations on the problems of the UNPAs, the hostile actions of the Serbian insurgents to be acts of terrorism.

The Republic of Croatia remains fully committed to the peace process, and it is ready to cooperate further with UNPROFOR in the fulfilment of its difficult mandate. Besides Security Council resolutions, the major guideline in our approach towards the achievement of a peaceful settlement in the Republic of Croatia remains the European Union Action Plan. Croatia is dedicated to remaining an element of stability and security in the region, in close cooperation with the United Nations. At the same time, I must once again emphasize the extreme importance of successful implementation of all the relevant Security Council resolutions for the rapid and peaceful reintegration of the UNPAs into the legal and political system of the Republic of Croatia. This is the only guarantee for peace and stability in the region.

In order to facilitate future UNPROFOR performance, and considering the situation on the ground, I am enclosing a series of goals and actions which Croatia considers to be necessary for the success of the renewed UNPROFOR mandate.

(Signed) Franjo TUDJMAN
President of the Republic of Croatia

Appendix

The Republic of Croatia considers that UNPROFOR should focus on the following in its renewed mandate:

(a) Ensuring respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, as emphasized in Security Council resolutions 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993, 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993, 847 (1993) of 30 June 1993 and 871 (1993) of 4 October 1993. Croatia finds it necessary that the Security Council authorize the following actions:

(i) The imposition, in accordance with Security Council resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992, of firm control over the international borders of the Republic of Croatia that form the boundaries of the UNPAs, thus preventing Serbian insurgents from violating them;

(ii) The immediate restoration of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the so-called "pink zones", beginning with the Drnis area. The town of Drnis is the largest settlement in the so-called "pink zones", with the following pre-war population structure: total population, 24,169; Croats, 18,732; Serbs, 4,974; Muslims, 21; others, 442. It is necessary to recall that the so-called "pink zones" were established with the consent of the Government of Croatia as a temporary measure, and that they are not considered as parts of the UNPAs (see S/24188);

(iii) The improvement of the control mechanisms for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), taking into consideration the Security Council decision that all import to, export from and transshipment through UNPAs in the Republic of Croatia shall be permitted only with proper authorization from the Government of Croatia;

(iv) Croatia requests the Security Council to authorize UNPROFOR to take control of the Djeletovci oil field, which is situated in the UNPA East (see S/25703). Any further exploitation of this oil field and transportation of the oil into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is not only a clear violation of resolutions 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 and 820 (1993), but also a criminal act against property of the Republic of Croatia.

(b) Restoring the communication and transportation facilities throughout the UNPAs and connecting them to the other parts of the Republic of Croatia:

(i) Priority must be given to the measures inscribed in paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 871 (1993), particularly concerning the opening of the railroad between Zagreb and Split and the highway between Zagreb and Lipovac, securing the uninterrupted traffic across the Maslenica strait and the opening of the Adriatic oil pipeline;

(ii) In addition to the aforesaid measures, Croatia is looking for the immediate reopening of the Klisa airport near the town of Osijek, which is of the utmost importance for the normalization of civilian life in the area of Osijek;

(c) Initiating the process of the return of refugees and detainees throughout the so-called "pink zones" and the UNPAs. Regarding the significance of this process, two important points should be considered:

(i) The recognition of the relevance of the 1991 census as basis for the final political settlement of the UNPAs. Since the outbreak of war in 1991, the Croat population that formerly inhabited the area has been ethnically cleansed by Serbian insurgents. According to the 1994 United Nations Population and Vital Statistics Report, 1/ in the 1991 census in the Republic of Croatia there were 4,784,256 inhabitants. The 1991 census registered 536,370 inhabitants in the entire territories that are presently known as UNPAs; 48.2 per cent out of this number were Serbs, 38.2 per cent were Croats and 13.6 per cent were members of other nationalities and minority groups. According to the 1991 census, the total population of the areas presently known as "pink zones" was 68,971; 49.1 per cent were Serbs and 47.1 per cent were Croats;

(ii) The selection of 50 settlements in the so-called "pink zones" and UNPAs as a starting-point and a model for the process of the return of refugees and displaced persons. The Government of Croatia is ready to cooperate closely with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian agencies in this process, bearing in mind the political sensitivity of this action and its possible consequences;

(d) Effectively disarming the Serbian insurgents in the so-called "pink zones" and UNPAs in accordance with the Vance plan and Security Council resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, as an essential condition for maintaining peace and stability in the area. UNPROFOR should draw upon its positive experience in removing heavy Serbian armament from the vicinity of Sarajevo. The credible threat of force has proved to be the most efficient way to deal with the Serbian aggression. Therefore, Croatia urges the Security Council to authorize the necessary use of force in achieving the aforesaid goal, and proposes the following:

(i) Complete control by UNPROFOR of the Udbina airfield, which is being used by the Serbian insurgents for launching their hostile air attacks against targets on the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (see S/1994/241);

(ii) The extension of the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 816 (1993) to the airspace of the Republic of Croatia so as to enable the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft monitoring the no-fly zone to enter Croatian airspace if they are in pursuit of aircraft which are violating the no-fly regime;

(e) Protecting fully the human and minority rights throughout the UNPAs:

(i) Croatia requests that the Security Council, in coordination with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, immediately deploy human rights monitors on a long-term basis throughout the UNPAs. Such a measure should provide necessary assurances that human and minority rights of all Croatian citizens in the UNPAs, regardless of their ethnic background, will be closely monitored and protected;

(ii) Croatia calls for the speedy beginning of the prosecution of war criminals from the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Croatia urges the United Nations to pursue the excavation of the mass-grave site at Ovcara, near Vukovar, in the UNPA Sector East;

(f) Initiating international cooperation and assistance to alleviate the consequences of war in Croatia. Economic help and industrial reconstruction of the part of the country devastated by war and subsequent occupation by the Serbian insurgents is of utmost importance for the success of the overall peace process. We therefore propose that the Secretary-General commence preparatory activities to organize an international conference for assistance in the post-war reconstruction of the Republic of Croatia, bearing in mind the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly (resolutions 47/166 of 18 December 1992 and 48/204 of 21 December 1993).

Notes

1/ Population and Vital Statistics Report: Data Available as of 1 January 1994, Statistical Papers, Series A, vol. XLVI, No. 1 (ST/ESA/STAT/SER.A/188).

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/305/Corr.1
18 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 MARCH 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Corrigendum

Appendix

Appendix, subparagraph (c), line 1

For detainees read displaced persons

94-13829 (E) 180394

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UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/306
16 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violations by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 3 November 1993, at 0900 hours, six Iraqi military personnel were seen in no man's land, south of Siranband at the geographic coordinates of NE 865006300 on the map of Baneh, north-east and south-east of border pillars 99 and 99/1.

2. On 3 November 1993, between 1000 and 1230 hours, eight Iraqi military personnel were seen digging a canal south-west of border pillar 46 at the geographic coordinates of NC 446754 on the map of Naftshahr.

3. On 3 November 1993, at 1145 hours, an Iraqi military helicopter was seen flying at the geographic coordinates of NC 3556 on the map of southern Naftshahr, 4 kilometres west of border pillar 45 and 3 kilometres south-west of border pillar 45/1.

4. On 3 November 1993, at 1430 hours, 120 Iraqi military personnel in groups of 6 were seen in the vicinity of Khaviseh base at the geographic coordinates of PA 9399 on the map of Koohe Gotbeh in no man's land, south of border pillar 24/7 and west of border pillar 24/10.

5. On 3 November 1993, at 1910 hours, Iraqi forces fired Dushka bullets at Iranian territory south of border pillar 25/11 from the geographic coordinates of PB 354422 on the map of Koohe Toonel.

6. On 6 November 1993, at 2015 hours, a number of antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographic coordinates of NF 0662 on the map of Piranshahr, south of Khadar Sharafan Heights, east of the Iraqi King Heights, north-east of border pillar 118/1 and at the geographic coordinates of NF 0762 on the map of Piranshahr, north of Ghomtareh, 5 kilometres east of Piranshahr. They engaged in an altercation with Iranian forces and then fled to Iraqi territory after a few of them were wounded. They left behind a Kalashnikov rifle and a collapsible gun with a metal stock.

7. On 6 November 1993, at 0940 hours, a number of Iraqi forces proceeded to install a gun at the geographic coordinates of NC 548416 on the map of Sumar, in no man's land, west of border pillar 43, opposite Cheshme Goli in Iran and the Mian Tang sentry post.

8. On 6 November 1993, at 1230 hours, an Iraqi loader belonging to the Iraqi sentry post of Tayyeb was seen entering the area at the geographic coordinates of QA 0390 on the map of Meimeh River, south of border pillar 24/1 and at the geographic coordinates of QA 0425092700 on the map of Meimeh River. The loader was then used.

9. On 6 November 1993, at 0930 hours, four Iraqi military personnel were seen digging a canal at the geographic coordinates of NC 771211 on the map of Halaleh in no man's land, east of border pillar 35/15 and west of border pillar 35/14, north-west of Meimak Heights.

10. On 7 November 1993, at 0815 hours, 10 Iraqi military personnel riding a Jeep left the vehicle and proceeded to build a road at the geographic coordinates of NC 681241 on the map of Kani Sheikh in no man's land, south of Abugharib Mount and border pillar 39/2, west of Ghalalem Mount.

11. On 7 November 1993, at 0900 hours, a number of Iraqi forces proceeded to install a Dushka gun and an anti-aircraft weapon at the geographic coordinates of ND 384123 and ND 387125 on the map of Khosravi, west of border pillar 56/1.

12. On 8 November 1993, at 0930 hours, 10 Iraqi military personnel were seen training at the geographic coordinates of NC 589317 on the map of Kasna Sheikh, west of border pillar 39/8 and south-west of border pillars 40 and 40A.

13. On 8 November 1993, at 1800 hours, 20 antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographic coordinates of NE 7566 on the map of Baneh. They then proceeded to barricade the road north of border pillar 99/5 and Koohassanbin and stopped drivers of vehicles passing through. The intruders fled to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

14. On 8 November 1993, between 1920 and 2130 hours, Iraqi forces at the geographic coordinates of NC 4270065200 on the map of Naftshahr in no man's land, west of Chalai and the border river of Goneh Kabood, fired 28 flare bullets.

15. On 8 November 1993, at 1500 hours, a number of antirevolutionary elements at the Iraqi side of the border river of Absirvan fired at the personnel of the sentry post of Baleh Bozan using individual weapons. The Iranian personnel who were patrolling at the geographic coordinates of PE 0835086400 on the map of Nosood returned the fire.

16. On 9 November 1993, at 1100 hours, four Iraqi soldiers were seen passing through the geographic coordinates of QA 0630093200 on the map of Meimeh River in no man's land south of border pillar 23.

17. On 10 November 1993, at 1210 hours, the Andros, accompanied by two tugboats, one of which flew the Iraqi flag and the other an unidentified flag, sailed past Khorramshahr piers in the direction of the sea.

18. On 10 November 1993, eight antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered the Iranian village of Bahram in the Sarvabad region of Marivan at the geographic coordinates of PE 1413 on the map of Baneh. They then proceeded to blackmail the villagers. The intruders left for Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

19. On 10 November 1993, at 0835 hours, an Iraqi mechanical shovel was sighted at the geographic coordinates of NC 635258 on the map of Kani Sheikh, south of Height 130 and west of border pillars 39/2 and 39/3.

20. On 10 November 1993, at 1040 hours, two Iraqi helicopters were seen flying at the geographic coordinates of NC 271615 on the map of southern Naftshahr, north-west of border pillar 46.

21. On 10 November 1993, at 1530 hours, a number of antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory. They gathered at the geographic coordinates of NE 7375 on the map of Baneh, north of border pillar 99/5 and Assanbin Heights and Shakh-e-ashkoot Mount. They intended to attack the police base, but were intercepted and fled to Iraqi territory.

22. On 11 November 1993, at 1010 hours, three Iraqi military personnel were sighted reconnoitring at the geographic coordinates of QA 0693 on the map of Meimeh River in no man's land south of border pillar 23.

23. On 11 November 1993, at 1110 hours, two Iraqi vehicles were observed at the geographic coordinates of NC 554398 on the map of Sumar in no man's land, south-west of border pillars 41 and 42 in the vicinity of the Koomeh Sang sentry post.

24. On 12 November 1993, at 1930 hours, seven antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory south-east of border pillars 95/4 and 95/5 at the geographic coordinates of PE 0947 on the map of Marivan. They entered the village of Haneh Sheikhan and returned to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

25. On 12 November 1993, at 2030 hours, eight antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographic coordinates of PE 1319 on the map of Baneh in the Sarvabad region. They entered the village of Khoshgin and returned to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

26. On 12 November 1993, at 2230 hours, six antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered the village of Balak in Iran at the geographic coordinates of PE 1523 on the map of Baneh in the Sarvabad region. They then entered the village of Shahrani, where the Iranian forces forced them to return to Iraq.

27. On 13 November 1993, at 1000 hours, an Iraqi crane was being operated near the Al-Abbas sentry post at the geographic coordinates of NC 589317 on the map

of Kani Sheikh, south-west of the sentry post of Kani Sheikh and west of border pillar 39/8.

28. On 13 November 1993, at 1340 hours, an Iraqi trailer carrying a bulldozer was seen moving at the geographic coordinates of NC 589317 on the map of Kani Sheikh, south-west of the sentry post of Kani Sheikh, in the vicinity of the Iraqi sentry post of Al-Abbas and west of border pillar 39/8.

29. On 13 November 1993, at 1700 hours, seven antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered the Iranian village of Saneh at the geographic coordinates of PE 1727 on the map of Baneh in the Sarvabad region. They made a brief stop in the village and then continued in the direction of Kopazeh village, which they entered at 1830 hours. They rested there for a while and then robbed the villagers of food and supplies. They left this village, located at the geographic coordinates of PE 1430 on the map of Khabbar-e-Tork, when pursued by Iranian forces. The intruders returned to Iraqi territory under the guise of the night.

30. On 13 November 1993, at 2130 hours, six antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered the Iranian village of Neshkanesh at the geographic coordinates of PE 2229 on the map of Baneh in the Sarvabad region. They left this village for the village of Dorri at the geographic coordinates of PE 2421 on the map of Baneh. They encountered Iranian forces at 2300 hours and then returned to Iraqi territory.

31. On 13 November 1993, at 2200 hours, six antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and penetrated 13 kilometres into Iranian territory east of border pillar 83/5 at the geographic coordinates of PE 0620 on the map of Ney. They entered the village of Tootoondarreh and encountered Iranian forces in the Dargah Sheikhan Tark region. The intruders then returned to Iraqi territory.

32. On 15 November 1993, at 0400 hours, a group of antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory 10 kilometres east of border pillar 83/5 and the vicinity of the Iranian sentry post of Visseh at the geographic coordinates of PE 0321 on the map of Ney. They were pursued by the personnel of the post and returned to Iraqi territory.

33. On 15 November 1993, at 1545 hours, seven Iraqi vehicles, each carrying a gun, were seen passing south of the Iraqi Hemad Sahab sentry post at the geographic coordinates of QA 082931 on the map of Meimeh River in no man's land, south of border pillar 22/49.

34. On 15 November 1993, at 1630 hours, Iraqi military personnel installed two Dushka guns and a mortar cannon on Height 256 at the geographic coordinates of NC 414985 on the map of Khosravi.

35. On 15 November 1993, at 2100 hours, four antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory east of Bashmagh and Vayveh sentry posts, 5 kilometres away from border pillar 90 at the geographic coordinates of NE 9740 on the map of Marivan. The intruders entered the village of Miran and robbed the villagers of money and supplies after terrorizing and threatening them. They returned to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

36. On 15 November 1993, at 2200 hours, two antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory, 13 kilometres east of border pillar 91. They entered the village Benavchelleh at the geographic coordinates of PE 0443 on the map of Marivan and returned to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces. The intruders suffered casualties.

37. On 15 November 1993, at 2220 hours, a group of seven armed antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered the Iranian village of Belkar at the geographic coordinates of PE 2535 on the map of Khiareh. The intruders were ambushed by Iranian forces and returned to Iraqi territory under the guise of night.

38. On 16 November 1993, at 2030 hours, Iraqis effected an explosion at the geographic coordinates of ND 641248 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land, north of the Iranian sentry post of Darkhoo and east of the Iraqi village of Majid Ghadir.

39. On 18 November 1993, at 1200 hours, Iraqi forces effected 10 explosions at the geographic coordinates of NC 832193 on the map of Halaleh in no man's land, west of border pillar 35/8 at Meimak Heights at Tappeh Shohada.

40. On 18 November 1993, at 1900 hours, four antirevolutionary elements crossed no man's land and entered the Iranian village of Bivarshan at the geographic coordinates of PE 3533 on the map of Chenareh. They returned to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

41. On 19 November 1993, at 0800 hours, seven Iraqi personnel were seen digging a trench at the geographic coordinates of NC 595330 on the map of Kani Sheikh in no man's land, north of border pillars 40 and 40A and south of border pillar 40/1.

42. On 19 November 1993, at 1700 hours, six antirevolutionary elements armed with light weapons crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at the geographic coordinates of PE 0321 on the map of Baneh. They returned to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

43. On 19 November 1993, at 1900 hours, six antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered the Iranian village of Dahseghieh at the geographic coordinates of PE 2928 on the map of Baneh in the Sarvabad region. They returned to Iraqi territory when pursued by Iranian forces.

44. On 19 November 1993, four antirevolutionary elements armed with light weapons crossed the border and entered Iranian territory east of border pillars 90 and 91 at the geographic coordinates of NE 9541. They entered the village of Sa'adabad and attempted to subject the villagers to extortion.

45. On 20 November 1993, at 1100 hours, 10 Iraqi soldiers were seen training to take over new positions at the geographic coordinates of NC 595330 on the map of Kani Sheikh in no man's land, north of border pillars 40 and 40A and south of border pillar 40/1.

46. On 20 November 1993, at 1600 hours, three Iraqi military personnel were seen repairing their positions at the geographic coordinates of PB 106724 on the map of Mehran in no man's land, south of Zalooab Mount and border pillar 33 at the Iraqi sentry post of Doraji.

47. On 20 November 1993, at 1400 hours, three Iraqi military personnel were seen digging the ground and installing unidentified objects at the geographic coordinates of ND 618243 on the map of Ghasr-e-Shirin in no man's land south of Majid Ghadiragha.

48. On 21 November 1993, at 0745 hours, 15 Iraqi soldiers were seen training in no man's land at the geographic coordinates of QA 586035700, north of Hoor-al-Howeizeh, south of border pillars 21/1 and 21/2.

49. On 22 November 1993, at 1300 hours, nine Iraqi non-military personnel were seen inspecting the area at the geographic coordinates of PB 096717 on the map of Mehran.

50. On 22 November 1993, 12 antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory at Piranshahr at the geographic coordinates of NF 1261 and fired an RPG-7 rocket and bullets at a vehicle passing through. This attack led to the martyrdom of an Iranian personnel.

51. On 23 November 1993, at 1130 hours, Iraqi forces set up a tent and a telecommunications instrument at the geographic coordinates of QA 003004800 on the map of Meimeh River in no man's land, south-west of border pillars 24/3 and 24/4 at Height 77.

52. On 23 November 1993, at 2145 hours, Iraqi forces stationed at the geographic coordinates of ND 386103 on the map of Khosravi proceeded to fire a mortar shell, which hit the geographic coordinates of ND 39600132 on the map of Khosravi in no man's land, north-west and south-west of border pillars 56 and 57 respectively.

53. On 24 November 1993, at 0700 hours, Iraqi forces stationed at the Chalai sentry post installed a telecommunications antenna at the geographic coordinates of NC 427654 on the map of Naftshahr.

54. On 24 November 1993, at 1100 hours, four Iraqi military personnel entered the buffer zone at the geographic coordinates of QA 0693 on the map of Meimeh River, south of border pillar 23. They then began to scout in the area.

55. On 24 November 1993, at 1740 hours, 30 antirevolutionary elements crossed the border and entered Iranian territory 11 kilometres east of Barisoo at the geographic coordinates of NF 6001. They proceeded to barricade the Barisoo-Sardasht road south of the village of Bikesh and took money from drivers by force. They released the drivers only after the latter paid.

56. On 28 November 1993, at 1645 hours, an Iraqi vessel being pulled by a Nissan tugboat left the port of Basra for the sea.

57. On 29 November 1993, at 1455 hours, the ocean voyager Dolphin 4, being pulled by a foreign tugboat, left the port of Basra for the sea.

58. On 29 November 1993, at 1540 hours, three antirevolutionary elements dressed in fatigues crossed the border at the geographic coordinates of NC 7320 on the map of Halaleh, west of the northern Halaleh sentry post. They entered Iranian territory south of Ghalalem Mount and Talkhab River. They encountered Iranian border police and fired at the latter. The border police responded and those elements fled and returned to Iraqi territory after one of them was injured. A Kalashnikov weapon with serial No. 19884360 belonging to the wounded antirevolutionary was left behind in Iran and was confiscated by Iranian forces.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Permanent Representative

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/307
17 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GERMANY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993 and to communicate that the national measures called for in the resolution have been implemented in Germany through the adoption of the thirty-first amendment to the Foreign Trade and Payments Order on 14 December 1993. In so far as European Union Regulation No. 3274/93 of the European Union's Council of 29 November 1993 (Journal of the European Communities No. 295, p. 1) has already given effect to the measures set out in the resolution, this amendment has only declarative significance since the European Union regulation establishes accepted law. The thirty-first amendment serves to enforce penal liability in the case of sanctions violations - also within the field of application of the European Union regulation. Violations against the embargo restrictions will be penalized as a criminal offence pursuant to the regulation and in conjunction with paragraph 34.4 of the Foreign Trade and Payment Order.

In particular the following measures have been taken to implement the sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya adopted by the Security Council in resolution 883 (1993):

(a) With regard to the restrictions on the transfer of goods and services with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, European Union Regulation No. 3274/93 of the Council of 29 November 1993 is in force to prevent supplying the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with certain goods and services (Journal of the European Communities No. 295, p. 1). The provisions of this regulation were incorporated into the Foreign Trade and Payment Order in order to establish penal liability (para. 69 (m) of the Foreign Trade and Payment Order in the version of 14 December 1993, Federal Journal, p. 10937);

(b) The prohibition to settle any claims as set forth in paragraph 8 of resolution 883 (1993) is implemented in Germany through European Union Regulation No. 3275/93 of the Council of 29 November 1993, which prohibits the settlement of any claims in connection with any contract or other transaction affected by Security Council resolution 883 (1993) or other resolutions in connection with it (Journal of the European Communities No. 295, p. 4). To enforce penal liability this regulation was published on 13 December 1993 in the Federal Journal (p. 10938);

(c) The restrictions on capital and payment transactions with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) are implemented in Germany through paragraph 69 (n) of the Foreign Trade and Payment Order in the version of the thirty-first amendment to the Foreign Trade and Payment Order of 14 December 1993 (Federal Journal, p. 10937);

(d) The restrictions on goods and services in the military and paramilitary sector which are already effective pursuant to Security Council resolution 748 (1992) continue to be in force and are now implemented through paragraph 69 (1) of the Foreign Trade and Payment Order in the version of the thirty-first amendment to the Foreign Trade and Payment Order of 14 December 1993 (Federal Journal, p. 10937).

The violation of any of the aforementioned provisions is punishable according to paragraph 34.4 of the Foreign Trade and Payment Order.

(Signed) Detlev GRAFF ZU RANTZAU
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL

S/1994/308
18 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 MARCH 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSIONS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from our Governments, we express our dismay at part of the presidential statement on Maglaj (S/1994/PRST/11), which we deem unfounded and potentially harmful to the ongoing peace process.

The overall message of the statement accurately condemns the Serbian aggression in the area of Maglaj. None the less, the part of the statement referring to the Bosnian Croats was incorrect and might have compromised the other positive elements of this statement. We wish to indicate that our sources on the ground, as well as other international elements consulted, have a very different understanding of the situation than that provided by the representative of the Secretary-General at the informal consultations on 14 March 1994 that preceded the adoption of the aforementioned statement and which was the basis for this unfortunate reference.

Since the signature of the Bosnian-Croat preliminary agreements in Washington on 1 March 1994 (S/1994/255), no action of the forces of Croatian Defence Council against the forces of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or vice versa, has been recorded by our respective Governments. In the same period of time, all humanitarian aid convoys have been given free passage through the Croat-held parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina en route to Muslim-majority enclaves and settlements, totalling 103 convoys and 9,300 tons of humanitarian aid since 1 March.

The town of Maglaj is completely surrounded by Serb forces only, and has been subjected to constant Serbian shelling since 17 January 1994. The Bosnian Croat forces are positioned within the enclave. The only Croat defensive forces that are still within the 15-mile radius around Maglaj are themselves encircled and threatened by the Serb forces in the Croatian enclave of Zepce. Zepce, a town on the Doboj-Maglaj road, is itself, as well as Maglaj, in dire need of humanitarian assistance and efficient protection from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Both our Governments would favour that the entire area be declared a safe-area.

North of Maglaj, in the area of the Usora valley, Croat defensive forces are joining in a valiant effort with Bosnian government defensive forces, in order to help besieged Maglaj to the best of their limited capacities.

We would kindly request your assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan MISIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
to the United Nations

(Signed) Vladimir DROBNJAK
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of the
Republic of Croatia
to the United Nations

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/49/95
S/1994/309
18 March 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 72 of the preliminary list*
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 17 March 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of March 1994, I have the honour to transmit herewith the conclusions of the meetings of the group of 12 Somali political factions, held in Cairo from 1 to 7 March 1994.

I request you to have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 72 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Ahmed ALHOUDERI
Permanent Representative of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the
United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

* A/49/50.

Annex

Conclusions of the meetings of the 12 Somali factions held in Cairo from 1 to 7 March 1994

I. INTRODUCTION

The leaders of the group of 12,

Guided by the Addis Ababa Agreement of 27 March 1993,

Taking account of the importance of the participation of all Somali factions in efforts for national reconstruction if the State is to be restored, and convinced that the exclusion of any of the factions, whether or not they were participants in the Addis Ababa or Cairo meetings, cannot serve the process of national reconciliation, reconstruction and the restoration of law and order in the country,

Aware of the difficulties that have faced the Somali people since the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement,

Cognizant of the efforts made by the Somali people and the international community to reach a permanent solution to the current Somali crisis,

Convinced that the time has come for reconciliation among us and for us to join hands in assuming our responsibility to history to save our nation and our beloved homeland,

Profoundly motivated to overcome our past differences and past enmity,

Responding forcefully to the wishes of our people, which aspires to peace and a life of dignity,

Responding to the voices raised by the people of Somalia and the international community calling for an end to the bloodshed and destruction,

And choosing the principles of tolerance and political coexistence,

Do hereby welcome the disinterested initiative of the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt in bringing together the Somali political movements with a view to reaching a durable political solution that will restore State unity and sovereignty to the Somali Republic and, in this connection, propose the following programme of action as a basis for political reconciliation among all the Somali political factions.

II. BASIC PRINCIPLES

The leaders of the group of 12 have agreed that the basic principles governing the implementation of this programme should stem from the following guidelines:

1. That any decision or initiative for the advancement of the national reconciliation process must be based on the Addis Ababa Agreement and on the interim constitution to which reference is made hereunder and which shall be agreed upon by the Transitional National Council.

2. Respect for and the protection and maintenance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Somali Republic.

3. Adherence to the principles of dialogue and mutual understanding and adoption of compromise solutions as a basis for the resolution of the Somali crisis.

4. The repudiation of violence as a means of resolving political disputes in Somalia.

5. Respect for the principles of justice, equality and free and fair elections so as to establish a multi-party democratic system.

6. Respect for basic human rights and for the rights of Somali citizens.

7. Collective rejection of any opposition to the collective decisions to be reached, and adoption of a common political and military position.

8. Priority for the restoration of basic social services and infrastructure.

9. The speedy revival of the national economy in accordance with the principles of the free market economy.

10. Cooperation with the international community.

11. Establishment of good and fraternal relations on a basis of good neighbourliness, cooperation with the neighbouring countries in the region, full respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of any State.

III. TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL SALVATION COUNCIL

Given that the National Salvation Council is still at the formative stage, taking into consideration the need to establish structures within the State for the purpose of restoring national sovereignty and saving Somalia from the predicament in which it finds itself, and inspired by the patriotic wishes of the people of Somalia, we have reached agreement on the following:

1. Establishment of a Transitional National Salvation Council to consist of 17 members, as follows:

(a) The 15 leaders of the Somali political factions that signed the Addis Ababa Agreement, including His Excellency General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress;

(b) The Chairman of the Somali National Movement, which participated in the National Reconciliation Conference of March 1993 as an observer;

(c) His Excellency Mr. Ali Mahdi Muhammad, whose membership was decided in accordance with the Addis Ababa Agreement.

2. The basic functions of the Transitional National Salvation Council are:

(a) To represent and give expression to the sovereignty of the Somali Republic;

(b) To legislate;

(c) To form and oversee the interim government;

(d) To complete the formation of the Transitional National Council;

(e) To establish public institutions.

3. The members of the Transitional National Salvation Council shall not be members of the interim government, who shall be chosen from among qualified national personnel of distinction.

4. The members of the Transitional National Salvation Council shall become part of the Transitional National Council, as stipulated in the Addis Ababa Agreement, on the election of at least two thirds of the members of the Transitional National Council.

5. Following the election of two thirds of the members of the Transitional National Council, the functions of the Salvation Council shall be transferred to the Transitional National Council, which shall function in accordance with the Transitional National Charter to be agreed upon within the two-year transitional period stipulated in the Addis Ababa Agreement.

6. The Transitional National Council shall be established within three months with effect from the date of implementation of this programme, and in the event that the formation of the Council is not completed within this period the members elected to the Transitional National Council shall join the Salvation Council until such time as the Transitional National Council is established.

7. The Transitional National Salvation Council shall elect every three months from among its members a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen on a rotation basis until such time as the Transitional National Council is established. The Chairman of the Somali National Movement and the Chairman of the Somali National Alliance, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, shall preside over the Salvation Council as part of the rotation.

8. The Chairman shall be elected every three months by simple majority vote.

9. The members elected to the chairmanship of the Transitional National Salvation Council may not be re-elected for a second term.

IV. FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

1. The government shall be formed in a balanced manner on the basis of equality and fairness.

2. The Chairman of the Transitional National Salvation Council shall consult with the other members of the Council on the appointment of a prime minister to form a government.

3. The government shall present its programme with a view to securing the agreement and confidence of the Transitional National Salvation Council by simple majority vote.

4. The members of the government shall be appointed from among qualified persons on a basis of equality.

V. MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES

1. The leaders of the political movements, including the Somali National Movement and the Somali Democratic Alliance, shall meet in Mogadishu before the end of March 1994 to discuss the implementation of the provisions of these decisions with their fellow leaders and with the other factions and groups.

2. This programme shall be submitted in writing to the Chairmen of the Somali National Movement and the Somali National Alliance in an appeal to them to join the ongoing process in the hope that their response to these efforts will be positive and cooperative.

VI. PREPARATION OF THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION AND GENERAL ELECTIONS

During the two-year transition period, the Transitional National Council shall undertake a population census, civil status registration and other measures in preparation for the elaboration of a national constitution leading to free and fair elections on the basis of a multi-party democratic system, with the support and assistance of the international community and in the presence of international observers.

VII. APPEAL

1. The leaders of the group of 12 appeal to the international community, and in particular to the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the United States of America, the members of the European Union, fraternal countries and the countries bordering on Somalia, to support the implementation of the provisions of these decisions on the basis of the principles of broad participation and justice.

2. The leaders of the group of 12, imbued with a spirit of fraternity and good faith, appeal to the Chairman of the Somali National Movement and the Chairman of the Somali National Alliance to participate in the implementation of this programme and thereby give expression to the sincerity of their intentions to engage in dialogue at any place and at any time with the goal of settling any matters that might prevent participation in the genuine reconciliation efforts now under way.

SIGNATORIES TO THE DECLARATION:

	Name of leader	Organization	Signature
1.	Mohamed Ramadan Arbow	Somali Africans Muki Organization (SAMO)	(Signed) [Illegible]
2.	Mohamed Farah Abdullahi	Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)	(Signed) [Illegible]
3.	Abdi Muse Mayo	Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)	(Signed) [Illegible]
4.	Ali Ismael Abdi	Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)	(Signed) [Illegible]
5.	Omar Hagi Mohamed	Somali National Front (SNF)	(Signed) [Illegible]
6.	Mohamed Ragis Mohamed	Somali National Union (SNU)	(Signed) [Illegible]
7.	Aden Abdillahi Noor	Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)	(Signed) [Illegible]
8.	Mouhamed Abshir Musse	Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)	(Signed) [Illegible]
9.	Abdi Warsame Isaaq	Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)	(Signed) [Illegible]
10.	Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	United Somali Congress (USC)	(Signed) [Illegible]
11.	Abdurahman Dualeh	United Somali Front (USF)	(Signed) [Illegible]
12.	Mohamed Abdi Hashi	United Somali Party (USP)	(Signed) [Illegible]

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GENERAL

S/1994/310
18 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AFGHANISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan with regard to the situation on the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was issued as Security Council document S/1994/235 dated 1 March 1994. The statement refers to the presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan at the border of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a document containing the main points of a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, in response to the above-mentioned statement of the Tajik authorities.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its attachment circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mr. A. G. Ravan FARHADI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Main points of the statement dated 25 February 1994, transmitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan by the Consulate of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in Dushanbé in response to the protest note of the Tajik authorities dated 22 February 1993

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan and refers to the statement of 22 February 1994 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan contained in a note delivered to the Consulate of Afghanistan in Dushanbé.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, with due regard to the principles of good-neighbourliness, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States and the observance of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good-Neighbourliness concluded between the Islamic State of Afghanistan and the Republic of Tajikistan, as well as the border treaty between the two countries signed during the official visit of the head of State of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to Tajikistan, has not and shall not allow anyone to use Afghan soil for the purpose of resorting to destructive operations against the Republic of Tajikistan.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, once again, reaffirms that it never wishes to see the friendly and brotherly country of Tajikistan face the problems of disturbances, fighting and bloodshed. The Islamic State of Afghanistan, after very useful and productive meetings, held in an atmosphere of goodwill and understanding, between H.E. Mr. Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and H.E. Imam Ali Rahmanov, President of the Republic of Tajikistan, in Dushanbé, expressed its full readiness to exert every effort in order to help to solve the problems of Tajik refugees in Afghanistan and the clashes on the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

Our Tajik friends are fully aware that there are such circles and elements who, by creating tensions, intend to damage utterly the cordial and fraternal relations between our two countries.

It is earnestly hoped that the destructive and hostile activities of these elements should not be attributed to the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

The accusation of involvement of some commanders of the Ministry of Defence of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in these clashes, as claimed in the letter of protest of Tajikistan, is considered by the Islamic State of Afghanistan to be baseless and deserves to be seriously rejected. However, the Islamic State of Afghanistan is ready to look at some other points mentioned in the Tajik protest note and to make an appropriate investigation. In the event that some of these complaints prove to be legitimate, the Islamic State of Afghanistan will take appropriate action towards identifying and punishing the elements involved.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan is of the opinion that the two sides, through joint efforts, may initiate and bring about a mechanism by which the security of the frontiers will be ensured and all types of hostile actions on the border between the countries will be prevented.

Referring to the claim of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan, namely that it is in possession of accounts attesting that the Tajik anti-government groups presently staying inside the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan are allegedly conducting and planning a series of hostile activities inside the territory of Tajikistan, the Afghan side states that the Tajik refugees have been given refuge and shelter as guests, on the basis of the traditional brotherly relations, between the people of Tajikistan and Afghanistan and on the basis of humanitarian considerations. The Tajik refugees have been made to understand that they must strictly refrain from conducting any possible hostile activities against the Republic of Tajikistan from within the territory of Afghanistan. They are, moreover, encouraged and exhorted to enter into negotiations with the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan aimed at solving the problem. The Islamic State of Afghanistan was encouraged to see that the leaders of the Tajik refugees accepted this call. Therefore, the notion of the planning of destructive activities inside Afghanistan is completely false and baseless.

The authorities of the Islamic State of Afghanistan seriously recommend to the friendly and fraternal Government of Tajikistan not to allow the Russian armed forces stationed on the border between the two countries to conduct armed attacks against the territory of Afghanistan. Such hostile acts would revive the bitter memories of the invasion of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union and would provoke the hard feelings of the Afghan people and mujahidin. Such attacks would certainly cause an intensification of the tension.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/311
18 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

1. By its resolution 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, the Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of six months, subject to the proviso that it would be extended beyond 75 days only upon a review by the Council, to be based on a report from the Secretary-General on whether or not substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement (see S/26063) and the political accords contained in the New York Pact (see S/26297, annex). Following receipt of my report dated 26 November 1993 (S/26802), the President of the Security Council addressed a letter to me dated 10 December 1993 (S/26864) containing the decision by the Council to continue the mandate of UNMIH for the full six-month period authorized by the aforementioned resolution. Therefore, the mandate of UNMIH will expire on 23 March 1994.

2. Further to my report of 19 January 1994 (S/1994/54), I regret to inform the Council that notwithstanding the continued efforts made on my behalf by my Special Representative for Haiti and by my staff, as well as by the Friends of the Secretary-General on the question of Haiti, there has been no change in the prevailing situation in Haiti that would have allowed the reactivation of UNMIH.

3. Efforts to reach a solution to the current political impasse in Haiti that would permit the resumption of the process initiated by the signing of the Governors Island Agreement continue unabated. My Special Representative and my staff, both at Headquarters and in Haiti, have not ceased their attempts to identify and encourage the establishment of common ground between the parties concerned. Recent political developments in Haiti have shed encouraging light on what has otherwise been a bleak scene. Members of both houses of the Haitian Parliament, representing all political tendencies in Parliament, reached an agreement on 19 February 1994 on a plan to break the present impasse and resume progress in implementing the Governors Island Agreement. This plan was endorsed in a resolution by the Chamber of Deputies on 3 March 1994. Efforts continue in the Haitian Parliament to effect a similar endorsement by the Senate. The plan as presented to me by its authors in a letter dated 19 February 1994 was transmitted to the Council on 20 February 1994 (S/1994/203). On that occasion, I informed the Council that I considered the plan to constitute a significant development. President Aristide, on the other hand, in a letter to me dated 7 March 1994, which I transmitted to the President of the Security Council on

10 March 1994, expressed his concerns that such a plan would be contradictory to the Governors Island Agreement and therefore could not be accepted by him.

4. In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider authorizing the extension of the mandate of the UNMIH in its present form for a period of three months, which would allow for the possibility of reactivating the Mission with a minimum of delay, should the current political impasse be breached and implementation of the Governors Island Agreement be resumed.

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GENERAL

S/1994/312
18 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

1. By its resolution 901 (1994) of 4 March 1994, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31 March 1994. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 21 March on whatever progress had been made in the negotiations and on the situation on the ground, with special attention to circumstances that might warrant a peace-keeping force and on the modalities for such a force.

2. In my last report (S/1994/253) on the situation in Georgia, I informed the Council that the third round of negotiations would resume at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 7 March 1994 in an effort to obtain the agreement of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to a declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict and to an agreement on the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons.

3. Three days of negotiations were held, from 7 to 9 March, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Edouard Brunner, my Special Envoy for Georgia. Representatives of the Russian Federation participated in that country's role as facilitator and the negotiations were also attended by representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

4. On 9 March, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, Chairman of Parliament and Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, visited New York to address the Council. I had a detailed exchange of views with him on the state of the negotiations and on the possibilities for action by the United Nations.

5. In the light of these latest negotiations, I see no reason to alter the judgement I expressed in my last report to the Council (see S/1994/253, para. 32) that "at present, however, the conditions that would make it possible to plan and deploy such a peace-keeping force with an achievable mandate do not exist".

6. Although much of the draft political declaration and virtually all the draft refugee agreement were acceptable to both sides, there remain three major issues on which they are still far apart:

(a) Recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia;

(b) The repatriation of refugees and displaced persons;

(c) The role and area of deployment of a possible peace-keeping force.

7. The recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia is a principle whose importance has been underlined by the Security Council in its resolution 896 (1994) of 31 January 1994 and earlier resolutions. The Georgian side wishes to see at least implicit recognition by the Abkhaz side. The Abkhaz side, however, denies that it has at present any territorial links with the Republic of Georgia, insists on being treated as an equal party to the negotiations on political status and says that it is prepared to consider the matter of recognition of territorial integrity once the outcome of political negotiations is known, but not as a precondition for those negotiations.

8. Regarding refugees and displaced persons, UNHCR seeks to maintain internationally accepted principles and practices for their voluntary repatriation and return, which do not allow for the introduction of screening mechanisms. The Abkhaz side, however, is concerned that the returnees would include persons who had fought in the recent conflicts and who would represent a threat to internal security because they might take up arms again. In the prevailing climate of mistrust and suspicion between the parties, no understanding has yet been found on provisions that would both respect international principles and accommodate the Abkhaz concerns.

9. Perhaps the widest difference of opinion concerns the role and area of deployment of a possible peace-keeping force. I described the attitudes of the two sides in my last report (S/1994/253, para. 21); they have not changed. The Georgian side wants a peace-keeping force to be generally deployed in Abkhazia with a mandate that would require it to guarantee the security of refugees returning to their homes, including the use of force, if necessary, against persons who threaten their security. The Abkhaz side says it would accept a force only if it was deployed along the Inguri River, which is the present line of confrontation, to guard against Georgian attack. The Abkhaz side refuses to permit deployment elsewhere and will not accept the presence of any international civilian police to assist the local authorities in dealing with returnees.

10. As stated above, many aspects of the two draft documents have been provisionally agreed, including a formal commitment to a cease-fire and the establishment of a standing committee to continue energetic efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement, including the establishment of a phased action programme. But the negotiation process is greatly complicated by the absence of any spirit of reconciliation between the two sides. Nor has it yet been possible to identify any measures that might create a more propitious climate for efforts to resolve issues that at present seem intractable. The level of tension in the area remains high and there is an increasing risk of return to war. In addition, the existence of over a quarter of a million refugees and displaced persons is creating ever greater strains. Spontaneous and disorganized returns will increase, with a likelihood of incidents of violence.

11. Although conditions for the deployment of a peace-keeping force do not at present exist and negotiations are, for the time being, suspended, I do not believe that this is the time for the international community to abandon its efforts. On the contrary, both parties to the conflict need outside help to assist them to find the road to peace. At the same time, they cannot expect the international community to maintain that assistance indefinitely if they do not both show a readiness to start rebuilding confidence and reconciling their differences. In this context, the Council may wish to know that I have received informal indications from both sides that they wish to find a negotiated settlement. In the same spirit, I strongly urge both sides to avoid taking any action that would be unhelpful to the negotiating process.

12. I accordingly intend to ask my Special Envoy to resume contact with the parties within the next few weeks, as well as with the Russian Federation in its role of facilitator. In the meantime, I recommend that the mandate of UNOMIG should be extended for a further three months, to 30 June 1994. UNOMIG observers would continue to carry out the tasks assigned to them in Council resolution 881 (1993).

13. As I stated in my last report (S/1994/253, para. 23), I shall continue further preliminary planning for the possible deployment of a peace-keeping force and report to the Council thereon as soon as political negotiations reach the point at which the Council might decide to establish such an operation.

14. Finally, I once again express my warm appreciation for the close support extended to the efforts of my Special Envoy by the Russian Federation, in its role of facilitator, and the generous help given by the Government of Switzerland.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/312/Add.1
23 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council of 18 March 1994 (S/1994/312), I recommended in paragraph 12 that UNOMIG be extended for a further three months, to 30 June 1993. It is also my recommendation that UNOMIG be maintained at its current strength, which stands at 22 military observers including the Chief Military Observers.

2. Should the Security Council approve my recommendations, it is estimated that the total cost would amount to approximately $1,005,000 gross for the three-month period. The monthly cost thereafter would amount to approximately $335,000 gross. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to approve my recommendations, that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the UNOMIG special account established for this purpose.

Annex

Cost estimates for the extension of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia for the period 1 April 1994-30 June 1994

(In thousands of United States dollars)

		Amount
1.	Military personnel costs	160
2.	Civilian personnel costs	409 a/
3.	Premises/accommodation	51
4.	Infrastructure repairs	-
5.	Transport operations	37
6.	Air operations	-
7.	Naval operations	-
8.	Communications	77
9.	Other equipment	13
10.	Supplies and services	20
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-
12.	Public information programmes	-
13.	Training programmes	-
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	-
15.	Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-
16.	Air and surface freight	124
17.	Integrated Management Information System	15
18.	Support account for peace-keeping operations	35
19.	Staff assessment	64
	Total	1 005

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a/ Comprises 12 international staff and 6 locally recruited staff.

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Distr.
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S/1994/313
19 March 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of violations by the Kuwaiti side of the provisions of the cease-fire and the instructions on implementation of the demilitarized zone, as follows:

1. At 1730 hours on 9 February 1994, a Kuwaiti vehicle bearing registration plate No. 31384-Kuwait entered Iraqi territory near the Halibah guard post at geographic coordinates 181278.

2. At 2030 hours on 12 February 1994, the Kuwaiti side fired 10 shots from the Abdali guard post at geographic coordinates 612320 in the direction of Iraqi territory.

3. At 1130 hours on 14 February 1994, two Toyota vehicles bearing Kuwaiti registration plates and carrying passengers approached the Safwan border complex control post, and, when ordered by the Iraqi control post personnel to establish their identity, the two vehicles drove off.

4. At 1630 hours on 20 February 1994, a patrol belonging to the Kuwaiti regime fired in the direction of the farm of Iraqi citizen Hatif Kazim Ulaywi in the Safwan area, wounding the above-mentioned citizen, who was taken to the Basra hospital.

5. At 1430 hours on 21 February 1994, a patrol of the Kuwaiti regime fired in the direction of the farm of Iraqi citizen Hasan Sa'id at geographical coordinates 626320, wounding the 14-year-old son of the above-mentioned citizen as he and his father were transporting materials from his farm. He was taken to the Basra hospital.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/314
19 March 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 18 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, during the period from 1 to 10 March 1994, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace for the purpose of reconnaissance and provocation.

1 March 1994

(a) Northern region: 21 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Dukan.

(b) Southern region: 34 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Basra, Busayyah, Jalibah and Qal'at Salih.

2 March 1994

(a) Northern region: 17 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 39 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Salman and Busayyah.

- At 1228 hours on 2 March 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Basra, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Shatrah, Shanafiyah, Rumaythah and Samawah. It departed at 1450 hours in the direction of Saudi Arabian airspace.

3 March 1994

(a) Northern region: No hostile aerial activity was recorded in the northern region on 3 March 1994.

(b) Southern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Artawi, Jalibah, Shatrah, Busayyah and Amarah.

4 March 1994

(a) Northern region: 23 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 41 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah, Qal'at Salih, Basra and Qurnah.

5 March 1994

(a) Northern region: No hostile aerial activity was recorded in the region on 5 March 1994.

(b) Southern region: 47 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Amarah, Samawah, Qurnah, Qal'at Sukkar, Ushbayjah, Busayyah, Jalibah, Artawi, Qal'at Salih and Nasiriyah.

- At 1200 hours on 5 March 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Basra, Amarah, Rumaythah, Shatrah, the region south of Diwaniyah and the region south of Najaf. It departed at 1410 hours in the direction of Saudi Arabian airspace.

6 March 1994

(a) Northern region: No hostile aerial activity was recorded in the northern region on 6 March 1994.

(b) Southern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Basra, Qurnah, Artawi, Jalibah, Busayyah and Qal'at Salih.

7 March 1994

(a) Northern region: 27 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

8 March 1994

(a) Northern region: 39 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

- At 1200 hours on 8 March 1994, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft violated Iraqi airspace, flying at a speed of 600 km/h and at an altitude of 20,000 m over Basra, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, the region south of Najaf and the region south of Diwaniyah. It departed at 1445 hours in the direction of Saudi Arabian airspace.

9 March 1994

(a) Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Ayn Zalah, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Nasiriyah, Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Shatrah, Samawah, the region south of Diwaniyah, Artawi, Jabayish, Jalibah and Busayyah.

10 March 1994

(a) Northern region: 29 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at medium altitude, centred on Basra, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Jalibah and Busayyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/315
21 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 14 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to inform the latter as follows:

Since Security Council resolution 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993 came into effect, the Government of China has formulated specific regulations on the implementation of the resolution and issued relevant notifications to the departments and entities concerned, which have been in strict compliance with the above-mentioned regulations.

94-14062 (E) 220394

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/316
21 March 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

NOTE VERBALE DATED 16 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation of 12 February 1994 "On measures related to the implementation of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993".*

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* The text of these measures may be consulted in room S-3545.

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